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of formal logic. On the other hand, the hypothetical forms of reasoning are employed every day, everywhere. They are "identical elements" in many diverse intellectual operations.

This method of exposition is, of course, not wholly new. Mr. L. J. Russell, for example, approximates it very closely in his *Logic from the Standpoint of Education*. But even he—whether because of deference to tradition or for some other reason—presents the hypothetical syllogism *after* the categorical. And most of the textbooks proceed on the assumption that the categorical type of argument is somehow the genuine, true and fundamental type, of which the hypothetical is but a more or less unwieldy derivative; as witness the desperate efforts of Jevons and others to reduce all hypothetical propositions to the categorical form. Is it not simpler to reverse the traditional order, to treat the hypothetical as the generic type, of which the categorical is a specific modification? There may be some recondite objection to this procedure; but until it is pointed out, the simpler organization of the subject-matter appears to be preferable.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology.

John Dewey. Henry Holt & Co. 1922. Pp. 336.

If pragmatism is not the sanctification of commercialism, and of course no one soberly supposes that it is, it may none the less be the intellectual accompaniment of the machine process—of industrial rather than commercial civilization. There is nothing incompatible, so at least Veblen asserts, between a high commercialism and the densest animism—indeed, quite the contrary. A well-matured machine technique, however, presupposes and directly cultivates the scientific temper. The reconstruction of philosophy in modern times must be regarded as a refunding operation through which philosophy is being merged with modern science. This process began with the starry heavens above; Professor Dewey's latest book suggests the speculation that its consummation may be the moral law within.

Naturally the development of empiricism from Bacon and Hobbes to the present revolt against Hegelian absolutism has not been without incident: that wave of absolutism in the nineteenth century is its chief incident. The unsurpassed scientific objectivity of Hume and Kant was swamped in the decades that brought the Holy Alliance and the Wesleyan revival by a general resumption of the

medieval habit of mind. And through the exigencies of university organization this habit has persisted well into the twentieth century so that a world which has become thoroughly trained in the scientific bent can contemplate the persistence at the centers of its intellectual life of a tradition which, conceiving the human soul in the spirit of the medieval church, proceeds to impute its characteristics to the universe at large, to the utter neglect if not the denial of the contrary scientific preconceptions of all the rest of the world.

The presence and continued (though weakening) vigor of this tradition accounts for the posture of contemporary empiricism, as distinguished from that of the period which the course books call "modern." The modern philosophy of Bacon, or even of Descartes, represented the first onslaught of physics and mathematics upon the glorified animism of medieval theology—of the solar system upon the soular system. Contemporary instrumentalism, speaking in a world now overwhelmingly scientific, is directed against the last stand of animism (for McDougall is right in identifying mentalism as animism) in the field of human behavior. The most bitterly contested issues in contemporary philosophy (arising between idealism and pragmatism) are psychological issues. The first great breach in the tradition of absolutism was made by a psychologist trained in medicine and physiology; Professor Dewey's most distinctive achievement also is behaviorism. The *Essays in Experimental Logic*, so metaphysical in tone, have as their principal burden the maintenance of the psychological (behaviorist) assumption that thinking is a part of human behavior and must be treated as such against a school which rejoices first to abstract thinking from the rest of the universe and then to bring the universe over into thought. Similarly the educational principles of *Democracy and Education*, etc., derive from the behaviorist assumption on the nature of education: the behavior of children, intellectual and otherwise, can be guided successfully only in such an environment as provokes the desired responses and allows them to integrate into habits.

Perhaps it is owing to his absorption in educational theory that Professor Dewey's own interest in the study of behavior and the attack upon animism has become increasingly social and has now resulted in a volume of lectures on social psychology. Perhaps it is also due to his large preoccupation with public affairs during the war and the peace—since the time of Randolph Bourne's devoted though "savage indignation" that he was not then "out in the arena of the concrete, himself interpreting current life."¹ Probably a deeper reason lies in the character of social psychology.

¹ *New Republic*, March 13, 1915.

The vital issues of behaviorism are at this moment to be found in social psychology. The inevitable extension of the experimental technique from biology to psychology at first involved no abatement of mentalism. Certain mental states seemed to be susceptible to the technique, which was accordingly applied—particularly of course to sensations, since the sense organs are the most accessible. In the course of time the physiological character of both investigations and data has come to be recognized and a rapprochement established between neurology and psychology, until now so large a proportion of the actual labors of all the psychologists is experimental that the distinction between behaviorists and others seems largely a matter of terminology. Simultaneously, however, has come a quite general sense that mentalism, unwittingly pushed out of individual psychology by the experimental technique, can make a stand on instinct in social behavior. Particular reactions may be experimentally reducible to neurological (or glandular) terms; general tendencies may still be couched in terms as mystical as one could wish. The spirit world, excluded from the reflex arc, the tropism, and the hormone, may still make its entrance through the magic potencies of instinct, precisely as it once did through Descartes's pineal gland. The Cartesian dualism of mystical and scientific principles in human behavior is today the dualism of instinct and habit. To be sure, general interest in the problem has shifted from theology to sociology; but the issues remain unchanged.²

Upon this problem Professor Dewey now takes his stand as uncompromisingly as in his most polemical metaphysics. *Human Nature and Conduct* presents Dewey's theory of the organization of human behavior, in individuals and communities, by habit and custom. Its fundamental postulate is the abandonment of the old individual psychology of separate and independent minds by which mind has been conceived as a mysterious intruder, or a mysterious parallel accomplishment of the natural world (pp. 84, 5). The corresponding antithetical assumption that is postulated in its place is the one which has been much more familiar hitherto in anthropology than in psychology. There the formula is: *Omnis cultura ex cultura*. "The problem of social psychology," writes Dewey, "is not how either individual or collective mind forms social groups and customs, but how different customs, establishing interacting arrangements, form and nurture different minds" (p. 63). "We

² Professor Dewey emphasizes this shift of interest, attributing it to the general "decline in the authority of social oligarchy" (p. 3), and interest in "doing away with old institutions" (p. 93). Of course magic potencies may be displayed on both sides of such controversies. Carleton Parker drew on McDougall's instincts in his defense of the I. W. W., though McDougall reserves them for God, for country, and for home.

often fancy that institutions, social customs, collective habit, have been formed by the consolidation of individual habits. In the main this supposition is false to fact. . . . Customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior customs" (p. 58). That is, the indispensable condition of the organization of behavior is preexisting organized behavior.

Such a theory of conduct has conspicuous implications for ethics. Professor Dewey accepts them at once, and accordingly makes moral conduct the chief subject of his analysis throughout the book. For such a theory of behavior as this, "morals mean customs, folkways, established collective habits. This is a commonplace of the anthropologist, though the moral theorist generally suffers from an illusion that his own place and day is, or ought to be, an exception. But always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities" (p. 75). By accepting the hardly more than Darwinian hypothesis that the facts of man are continuous with those of the rest of nature we can ally ethics with physics and biology; by accepting the anthropological dogma of the continuity of all human activity we can link ethics with history, sociology, jurisprudence, and economics (p. 12). Even moral philosophy can be assimilated to modern science!

The three lectures, on habit, impulse, and intelligence, which make up the bulk of the book, seek to indicate how this may be done. They are an introduction not so much to the subject of social psychology, or of ethics, as to the problems: not a syllabus outline of a fully developed science but a preliminary statement of the presuppositions upon which a science may be developed. Habit is the framework and custom the content of behavior. Impulse is the propelling, energy-releasing force behind all activity—not in the form of the familiar instincts (there are no separate instincts), but as a tremendous multiplicity of exceedingly circumscribed reactions to specific stimuli.³ They require to be organized by habit into modes of behavior and only thus assume form as the activity of civilized man. And if we do not know, at least we know how with our habits. Knowledge lives in the muscles, trained muscles, not in consciousness. Thought is the interruption, the clash, the readjustment of habits.

³ Professor Dewey gives the reader every reason to suppose that the impulses which he retains as the basis of all behavior after the rejection of "separate instincts" are the reflexes and tropisms and so on, familiar to the neurologist. For some reason, to my mind highly questionable, he refrains from any direct assertion to this effect either in the form of a reference to the literature of neurology or by the use of identifying technical words. Perhaps neither could be done in lectures; but as an "Introduction" the book ought to introduce.

All this becomes concrete when it is applied to the problem of conduct. Morality is custom-organized, habitual behavior; there are no bad habits but custom makes them so. No moral order is based on instinctive, eternally unalterable behavior, nor can moral order result from the abrogation of all organizing conventions. Morality is the ordering of habit by intelligence. Rejecting all ethical principles that would identify morality with some special type of impulse or experience, Professor Dewey describes it essentially as Kant did—as order. “Intelligence is concerned with foreseeing the future so that action may have order and direction” (p. 238). Morality is the outcome of practical reason.

And then—strangely enough, for, from the *Outlines of Ethics* (published at Ann Arbor in 1891) to the present work, Dewey has devoted more space to the criticism of Kant than of any other philosopher, and always for this very peculiarity—he recommends intelligence!

This is no new thing, of course. “Creative intelligence” has been as much a slogan as a description among pragmatists since James. Professor Dewey’s constant insistence in his philosophical writing upon the functional, experimental character of the thinking process seems to express a very deep-lying and in the end hyperlogical belief in its efficacy; while in the magazine articles his enthusiasm for intelligence approximates that of the revivalist.⁴

It is not my object here to give Kant an inning against his most insistent critic, nor even to assert the futility of advising the world to be intelligent, to organize its habits flexibly, and all that. Professor Dewey has made the best possible case against an ethics of mandatory principles in this book.⁵ Simply to note that the categorical imperative appears from chapter to chapter is interesting, however.⁶ In his famous essay on the influence of Darwin on philosophy Professor Dewey summarized as follows: “No one can

⁴ E.g., “The American Intellectual Frontier,” *New Republic*, May 10, 1922.

⁵ E.g., p. 27. “Recently a friend remarked to me that there was one superstition current among even cultivated persons. They suppose that if one is told what to do, if the right *end* is pointed out to them, all that is required in order to bring about the right act is will or wish on the part of the one who is to act.” *Etc., etc.*

⁶ An individual “can, if he will, intelligently adapt customs to traditions” (p. 75). “The most precious part of plasticity consists in ability to form habits of independent judgment and of inventive initiation” (p. 97). “In learning habits it is possible for men to learn the habit of learning. Then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life” (p. 105). “The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge the significance of what we are doing. . . . Therefore the important thing is the fostering of those habits and impulses which lead to a broad, just, sympathetic survey of situations” (p. 207).

fairly deny that at present there are two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one hand there are making many sincere and vital efforts to revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance with its demands. On the other hand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of absolutist philosophies.” Is it certain that the two will be wholly separate? Perhaps the gospel of science contains its own absolutism, its own rationalism, its own infinite,⁷ its “appeal through experience to something that essentially goes beyond experience”—beyond, that is to say, the coolly skeptical experimental observations of the scientist.

Without doubt this is a lapse in logic. Yet for the discriminating reader it may serve to make the book a human document without materially affecting the clarity of the issues. Life is a continuous lapse of logic, and this book seems to me rather more alive, more directly and humanly expressive, than any other that Professor Dewey has yet written. This is yet another reason why, though it is an introduction, it is not a syllabus. One feels in reading that the whole range of interest of a most flexible mind is being played upon the text. The harmonies are rich and varied, and sonata-form gets lost in their depths. Indeed, the organization of the book is very loose—much less rigid even than the analytical table augurs. In general it follows the three-fold division indicated above; but apart from that the ideas flow down their natural and broken course rather than through the concreted channel of a pre-determined order.

The course provides many interesting moments. “All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they *are* will” (p. 25). “For will means, in the concrete, habits; and habits incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments *of* the environment, not merely *to* it” (p. 52). “Were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could exist. There would be simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolated acts. Character is the interpenetration of habits” (p. 38). “Why have men become so attached to fixed, eternal ends? Why is it not universally recognized that an end is a device of intelligence in guiding action, instrumental to freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided tendencies? . . . Ends are, in fact, literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences” (pp. 231-2). “As we account

⁷ “Religion, as a sense of the whole, is the most individualized of all things Instead of marking the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole, it has been” (p. 331).

for war by pugnacity, for the capitalistic system by the necessity of an incentive of gain to stir ambition and effort, so we account for Greece by power of esthetic observation, Rome by administrative ability, the middle ages by interest in religion, and so on. We have constructed an elaborate political zoölogy as mythical and not nearly as poetic as the other zoölogy of phoenixes, griffins and unicorns" (p. 111). "Current democracy acclaims success more boisterously than do other social forms, and surrounds failure with a more reverberating train of echoes. But the prestige thus given excellence is largely adventitious. The achievement of thought attracts others not so much intrinsically as because of an eminence due to multitudinous advertising and a swarm of imitators" (p. 66). "It is only by accident that the separate and endowed 'thought' of professional thinkers leaks out into action and affects custom" (pp. 68-9). ". . . think of the insolent coercions, the insinuating briberies, the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled. Education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of custom" (p. 64).

In short this is the most eminently readable and quotable book Professor Dewey has written.⁸ But it is not a "text"; it will not suit the orderly and sterile mind of the efficient teacher. And it will be a hard book for professional attackers and defenders of the pragmatic faith, for the word "pragmatism" occurs only in the index, the word "instrumentalism" not at all.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVISTA DE PSIQUIATRIA Y DISCIPLINAS CONEXAS (Lima). IV, 2. April, 1922. Los Mitos Médicos peruanos: *Hermilio Valdizán y Angel Maldonado*. Confusión mental en la encefalitis epidémica: *Max. Gonzales Olaechea*. El Mongolismo: *E. S. Guzmán Barrón*. Reacción subepidérmica a la adrenalina como método de exploración del sistema nervioso simpático: *Delfín C. Espino*. La negación de la paternidad como síntoma psicótico (conclusion): *Honorio F. Delgado*. Tratamiento de la epilepsia por el luminal: *Honorio F. Delgado*.

⁸ This in spite of the lack of tonality of its author's style—frequently noted by reviewers—which allows him to use the jarring form "morals is," and to pass over slips in construction like that on p. 22, line 16, or the "one-them" of a sentence quoted above.